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Imagine yourself standing on the edge of a canyon, marveling at the terrain below,
wondering about all the sights currently obscured from your view, and lamenting
that you just don't have time to commit to the steep descent in and long trek across,
which would give you a perspective from right up close. Being handed Juha Räikkä's
new book Social Justice in Practice is like being told there's a fying fox you can take:
the canyon is applied political theory, and the fying fox allows the reader to see
many different issues, at some speed, and always with the wider context in view.
Tuck your loose items of clothing away in your bags, and hop on.
The book is loosely organized into six sections, with twelve chapters overall.
The frst two sections ("Theory and Practice" and "Action and Uncertainty")
introduce readers to the issues around the methodology of contemporary political
theory, from whether the arguments of political theory should be more sensitive to
what is feasible, through the correct weight to assign to citizens' political expectations
that things will remain more or less the same, the bases of political reasoning about
what is second-best when ideally preferred alternatives prove to be unavailable, and
to what is taken as presumed (i.e. which side has the burden of proof) when it comes
to political argumentation and political obligation. The third and sixth sections
("Unmasking Injustices" and "Self-Deception as Explanation") concern epistemic
issues, including the acceptability of conspiracy theories, and self-deception for both
religious and cultural reasons. The fourth section ("Privacy and Justice") concerns
information broadly construed, in particular privacy and secrets, and the ffth section
("Morality and Inner Life") is about forgiveness and alien beliefs. The chapters are
self-contained, so readers can feel free to either read the book from cover to cover, or
to dip into different chapters as suits their interests.
It would be impossible in a review-length piece to engage deeply with all
twelve of the topics contained in Räikkä's book. I've chosen to focus in what follows
on the parts of the book that I know best, to maximize the chance of saying
something useful. So I'll restrict my attention to just two of the chapters, which are,
respectively, "Social Justice in Practice", and "How to Find the Second-Best Option"
(noting, for the record, that I found "The Dilemma of Conservative
Justice"―wedged between these two―especially interesting and useful). Readers
interested in, or more familiar with, the book's later topics are encouraged to consult
the book directly.
In recent years there has been some backlash against the utopianism of much
contemporary political theory, which has taken the form of increased discussion
about the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory and the proper place of
each within political theory as a discipline. Some think ideal theory has no place at
all, because we should be solving the problems we actually have rather than
constructing perfect theoretical worlds in which those problems are abstracted away
from; some think non-ideal theory has no place at all, because it involves
unacceptable concessions to the status quo. The claim that political theory needs a
greater proportion of feasibility-constrained arguments weighs in on the non-ideal
side of this debate. It doesn't entail that this is the right kind or the only kind of
political theorizing; just that it's important, both for evaluating the current political
order, and for shifting to a better one, that we take certain constraints as fxed and
think about the improvements we can make in spite of them.
In Chapter 1, "Social Justice in Practice", Räikkä argues that feasibility
arguments are of most beneft to those who in fact cannot make use of them, and
that given his view of the role of political theory, it's just not true that political theory
needs a greater proportion of feasibility-constrained arguments. Let me explain each
of these claims, before commenting on what I think is mistaken about them.
The frst claim, about beneft, is that in political life, a claim that some
outcome is infeasible and therefore we should pursue an alternative course of action
will often be benefcial to those who, by their actions, actually make the outcome
infeasible. Räikkä gives many examples, including: the people of a country who
claim that the government's improving public health by prohibiting the consumption
of alcohol would result in a black market for liquor; the talented, who claim that
without suffcient economic rewards they would not be motivated to exercise those
talents for the beneft of the greater society; nurses, who claim that without increased
wages they'll emigrate to countries where the pay is better; religious groups, claiming
that if ritual slaughter of animals is prohibited it will simply be outsourced to the
black market where it will likely involve even more suffering for the animals; and
parents of sick children, who claim that if the government decreases its subsidies of
the required medicines they'll turn to less safe but cheaper alternatives online.
In each case, the people making the claims about what outcomes would
follow if certain measures were implemented are themselves responsible for
producing those outcomes. People could obey a law prohibiting alcohol, the talented
could take talent as its own reward, nurses could work for comparatively low wages,
religious groups could stop slaughtering animals, and parents could simply spend
more on medicines. But feasibility arguments are agent-relative; they explicitly
exclude 'self-prediction'. I can't say "it's infeasible that I write this review of Räikkä's
book, because I'm going to watch another episode of The Killing instead" (the hidden
premise being that I ought to write the review only if it's suffciently feasible that I
do). Many analyses of feasibility assume the trying of the relevant agent, so they
would say my writing the review is feasible if I would be suffciently likely to write it,
so long as I tried. But of course, if I tried I'd likely succeed, so writing the review is
not infeasible for me after all. But the citizens, the talented, the nurses, the religious,
and the parents in Räikkä's examples are all in that position, so while they'd do well
out of having their claims about infeasibility accepted (in gaining concessions by
government), they're in fact not in a position to make those claims. Infeasibility is no
excuse for those whose actions cause it. Those arguments, then, are really just threats
in disguise: the nurses are saying that if the government doesn't raise their wages,
they'll leave the country.
Räikkä's second claim relies on the role of political theory being to inform
public debate over political issues. Accepting for the moment that this is its role (I do
not think it is and will soon explain why), his claim is that the overall message
political theorists give the public should be "be better", rather than "give in to
threats". A nice example of this choice is featuring in the news and across social
media at the moment: nail polish that detects rape drugs in beverages. The nail
polish is clearly a non-ideal solution, because it takes the prevalence of attempted
drugging for granted, and it looks to protect potential victims by giving them a way
to detect the presence of the drugs in their drinks. Many commentators are angry
about the invention, because they think it sends the wrong message, namely that it's
the responsibility of the potential victim to ensure she isn't raped (to wear the nail
polish, to check her drinks) rather than the responsibility of the would-be rapists not
to rape.  If political theorists were to have the opportunity to weigh in on this debate,
they should be giving "ideal" argumentation, namely about the wrongness of rape,
the importance of enthusiastic consent, about gender-egalitarianism, and about
mutual respect; not "feasibility-constrained" argumentation, conceding that the
world is a place with rape in it, and advising women to protect themselves as best
they can (or others to protect potential victims as best they can, including by coming
up with these kinds of inventions). In  Räikkä's view, the role of political theory is to
inform public debate, and this should be done by sending the clear, "ideal" message:
which in this case would be that it is the responsibility of men not to rape.
So much for the main claims of the chapter; now to the problems with them,
taking the latter claim frst. While one role of political theory may well be to weigh in
on public political debate, that is surely not its only role. Political Theory is a sub-
area of Philosophy, and philosophical inquiry is broadly-speaking the pursuit of
truth. It determines both evaluative truths (truths about what is good, whether or not
it can ever be actual) and normative truths (truths about what we should attempt to
bring about). Setting aside the evaluative truths, the normative truths may be
unconditional (ought p) or conditional (given that not-p, ought q). The following two
claims are not mutually exclusive: would-be rapists ought not to rape, and, given that
at least some would-be rapists will in fact rape, victims ought to be protected as
much as possible from potential attack. We can lament the fact that our
circumstances are such that the latter is true―I'm sure we would all agree that we'd
much rather be in a world in which anti- rape drug nail polish were not a useful
invention. (Whether the nail polish is an effective and not overly demanding means
of protection is an empirical question). Whether a political theorist wants to make an
unconditional, "ideal" claim, or a conditional, "feasibility-constrained" claim,
depends on the kind of project she is interested in, and wanting to weigh in on public
debate does not determine that she make only the former types of claims.
Taking Räikkä's side in this debate has the advantage of avoiding any
accusation of victim-blaming, because it avoids giving any responsibilities at all to
those who might either use the nail polish, or who might create the nail polish or
other similar inventions, and therefore avoids blaming them if they fail to act on
those responsibilities (which would indeed be a despicable implication in the case of
the victim: we certainly do not want to say that a person who fails to wear the nail
polish is in any sense at all responsible for her situation if she is attacked). But going
in for feasibility-constrained recommendations has the advantage of not restricting
moral advice to contexts in which there is no wrongdoing. Even if the reader
disagrees over the diagnosis of the nail polish case, there are many other cases in
which we want to know what the good worlds look like given that certain wrongs will
remain in place, or at least not be completely eradicated).
Returning to the frst claim, this makes a serious mistake in understanding
agent-relativity. Feasibility assessments do not permit of self-prediction, but in none
of the examples Räikkä used was there something resembling a "self"―either an
individual self or collective agent―whose actions were being predicted. He
acknowledges this, to some extent, when he says "to assume that nurses could decide
not to emigrate... is not to assume that there is a strictly organized collective agent",
but it's not merely that there is no "strictly organized" collective. There are only
uncoordinated aggregates of persons: citizens of a country, those with talent, nurses,
those in a certain religious group, parents. Perhaps there are cases, such as when
nurses are represented by strong and cohesive labour unions, or when religious
groups are coordinated within one church, where the groups can act on (the
functional equivalents of) intentions, and thereby count as a single unit for the
purposes of assessing feasibility. Parents, those with talent, and most likely citizens,
do not count in this way. Thus the claim that those who would most beneft from
infeasibility arguments cannot make use of them falls down.
Assessments of what is feasible, and how our normative recommendations
ought to be adjusted in light of what is feasible and what isn't, are usually made by
political theorists, political analysts and commentators, policy advisors, those in
government. Those people can all make predictions about what will happen if
certain measures are implemented, such as making the consumption of alcohol
illegal, or refusing to raise nurses' wages. They might well reason that on balance, a
future in which nurses simply accept low pay without being incentivized to emigrate
by neighbouring countries' higher wages is infeasible, and give a feasibility-
constrained argument (holding this fact fxed) that it is better to swallow the costs of
raising wages than the costs of large-scale emigration of nurses. Räikkä does not
deny that this is possible, but he greatly understates the extent to which this is the
primary use of feasibility-constrained argumentation, and the use to which many
working on feasibility envisage it being put to.
In Chapter 3, "How to Find the Second-Best Option", Räikkä makes a
helpful distinction between three different ways in which we might approximate
when our political "bests" are out of reach. He calls these "condition", "degree" and
"denial". Condition-based approximation tells us to get as many of the things that
matter as we can. Degree-based approximation tells us to get as much of each of the
things that matter as we can. And denial-based approximation tells us to go for the
ideal even when we know it won't quite be realized, because what we'll get will
probably be close enough to be an adequate approximation What's great about this
chapter is that it doesn't make the same mistake as quite a bit of the discussion of
second-bests in political theory by following the economic results and assuming the
interdependence of the desirable elements of the "best". Values are independent: it's
just not true that fnding one to be out of reach we should revise our whole
conception of what we're aiming for. To put these different methods of
approximation in terms of a political case, imagine that the case for Scottish
Independence is strong on the grounds of community, security, and self-
determination. And now imagine that our best empirical predictions tell us that we
just cannot get an independent Scotland that is fully self-determining, while also fully
secure and fully embodying community. Assuming these three values to have equal
weight, the condition-based approach would tell us to take whichever two we liked
(3/3 conditions is best, but 2/3 conditions beats 1/3);  the degree-based approach
would tell us to get as much self-determination, security and community as we can
(any confguration with some of each value instantiated beats any confguration in
which one value remains entirely uninstantiated); and the denial-based approach
tells us to just go ahead with whatever the original plan was, assuming things will
work out as "close enough".
There are two problems with the discussion in this chapter. The frst is that
the example Räikkä uses (about where to take a holiday) is unhelpfully apolitical, and
misleading in the case of the degree-based conception. The problems with getting
"more rather than less" of a value are put in geographical terms, and give the wrong
results for that reason, because getting closer to a holiday destination (and ending up
somewhere in the ocean) is quite obviously not better than going somewhere else
entirely. But a more sophisticated understanding of the metric of degrees―which is
to say, what counts as more or less of something―will avoid this problem.
Approximating a relaxing holiday in the sunshine might take you geographically far
afeld from the original destination, just as approximating comprehensive security,
community, and self-determination in an independent Scotland might take you
politically far afeld from the utopian vision of independence. If the scale is specifed
well, the imperative to get more rather than less doesn't look nearly as problematic.
 Räikkä's argument in the chapter is that real people when making decisions
about approximation don't actually rely on any of these three theoretical versions of
approximating, and therefore those versions can't be criticized on the grounds that
they cause poor decision-making. Even if the outcomes of their decisions often align
with the outcomes any one such procedure would yield, that is not a reason to be
critical of that procedure. He takes this to make the three theoretical versions of
approximation immune from empirical rejection.
However, what he doesn't comment on is which of the three is in fact
theoretically the most well-motivated, or has the greatest advantages over the others.
The denial-based approach looks obviously inappropriate, yet little is made of this.
Perhaps his aim was only to insulate practice from theory (and vice versa), but having
made these useful distinctions between the ways in which approximating might be
done, it was somewhat unsatisfying that more was not said about how second-best
theorizing ought to go, and what the right relationship between such theory and
practice might look like.
Holly Lawford-Smith
University of Sheffeld
